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When Conditions Go Bad: An Examination of the
Problems Inherent in the Conditional Use Permitting
System
The purpose of a Conditional Use Permit is to allow proper
integration of uses into the community which may only be suitable
in specific locations and may have potentially detrimental
1
characteristics if not properly designed, located, and conditioned.

INTRODUCTION
2

Imagine a piece of property in Salt Lake City, Utah. This
property is located within a Neighborhood Commercial zone. This
zone “is intended to provide for small scale, low intensity
commercial uses that can be located within and serve residential
3
neighborhoods.” Within this zone, there are numerous permitted
uses such as bed and breakfasts, medical clinics, daycare centers,
4
museums, offices, urban farms, and recycling collection stations.
Seeing a business opportunity in the community, the property owner
decides to open a gas station. However, this is not a permitted use in
this zone; it is a conditional use.
The Salt Lake City Code defines a conditional use as “a land use
which, because of its unique characteristics or potential impact on
the municipality, surrounding neighbors or adjacent land uses, may
not be compatible or may be compatible only if certain conditions
5
are required that mitigate or eliminate the negative impacts.”
Deciding to move forward with building a gas station, the property
owner applies for a conditional use permit. Under Utah law, a
conditional use application “shall be approved if reasonable
conditions” are applied to the property that “mitigate the reasonably

1. PROVO,
UTAH,
CODE
§
14.02.040
(2014)
available
at
http://www.codepublishing.com/ut/provo/html/Provo14/Provo140200.html#14.02.040.
2. The author uses Salt Lake City merely as an example because he is familiar with the
zoning laws in Salt Lake City.
3. Salt Lake City Zoning Districts, MAPS.SLCGOV, http://maps.slcgov.com/mws/zon
ing.htm (last visited Oct. 2, 2014).
4. SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH, CODE § 21A.33 (2014), available at http://www.sterling
codifiers.com/codebook/index.php?book_id=672 [hereinafter SLC CODE].
5. Id. at 21A.54.010(A).
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anticipated detrimental effects” of the conditional use. Unsure what
it means to impose a “reasonable condition,” the property owner
consults the Salt Lake City Code for guidance and finds the
following:
C. Conditions Imposed: The planning commission, or in the case
of administrative conditional uses, the planning director or the
director’s designee, may impose on a conditional use any
conditions necessary to address the foregoing factors which may
include, but are not limited to:
1. Conditions on the scope of the use; its character, location,
hours and methods of operation, architecture, signage,
construction, landscaping, access, loading and parking, sanitation,
drainage and utilities, fencing and screening, and setbacks; and
2. Conditions needed to mitigate any natural hazards; assure
public safety; address environmental impacts; and mitigate dust,
fumes, smoke, odor, noise, vibrations; chemicals, toxins,
7
pathogens, gases, heat, light, and radiation.

Under the Salt Lake City Code, the planning commission can
impose conditions on the conditional use permit covering almost any
aspect related to the property or its use. Additionally, there are no
real limits to the conditions that can be imposed. The planning
commission has extremely broad authority to impose conditions, and
this broad authority can, and in some cases does, lead to violations of
property owners’ rights. Based on these conditions, the property
owner in this hypothetical has little idea what might be asked of her
if she is granted her permit. Vague standards, like this one, are only
one of the myriad problems inherent in conditional use permits.
While conditional use permits provide an important tool to land
use boards, they also create a host of problems. These permits are
intended to provide flexibility to cities and give them a means to
control growth and mitigate negative externalities. However, that
same flexibility gives rise to great uncertainty, which can lead to a host
of legal issues, not the least of which is violation of constitutional
rights. The interplay between these conflicting forces, flexibility and
certainty, is at the heart of the conditional permitting scheme.
Flexibility is desired, but at the same time shunned.

6. UTAH CODE ANN. § 10-9a-507(2)(a) (LexisNexis 2012).
7. SLC CODE § 21A.54.080(C).
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This Comment will examine the interplay between flexibility and
certainty and will look at how conditional use permits can, and often
do, lead to violations of landowners’ rights. Part I of this Comment
will begin by providing an overview of conditional use permits by
explaining the purpose, features, and function of a conditional use
permit. Then Part II will examine some of the common problems
faced by property owners seeking conditional use permits. These
problems include unconstitutional vagueness, violations of the
nondelegation doctrine, unconstitutional exactions, violations of
vested rights and nonconforming use statutes, and various other
constitutional problems. Part III concludes.
I. WHAT IS A CONDITIONAL USE PERMIT?
Before we can delve into the myriad of problems inherent in the
operation of conditional use permits, we must first understand what
they are and how they function. This Part will provide a brief
overview of the conditional use permitting scheme by explaining
what a conditional use permit is, why political subdivisions use
conditional permits, how a conditional use permit ordinance works,
and what is meant by attaching “reasonable conditions” to a
conditional use permit.
A. What Is a Conditional Use Permit and How Does It Differ from
Other Land Use Planning Devices?
Within a land use zone there are typically permitted uses,
8
conditional uses, and uses that are not allowed. Conditional uses
fulfill an important role in land use planning. These uses (sometimes
termed “special uses”) are intended to provide flexibility to
9
municipalities and prevent the negative externalities of those uses.
Without conditional uses, a use that may be beneficial to the
character and nature of a zone, but that also produces negative
externalities, would either be allowed without restrictions or not
allowed under any circumstances. This all-or-nothing approach can
cripple a planning commission’s ability to provide necessary services
8. See SLC CODE at § 21A.33, for a sample land use table illustrating what uses are
permitted, conditional, or not allowed within the commercial zones of Salt Lake City, Utah.
9. See W.E. Shipley, Annotation, Attack on Validity of Zoning Statute, Ordinance, or
Regulation on Ground of Improper Delegation of Authority to Board or Officer, 58 A.L.R.2d
1083 (1958).
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within a particular zone if those services may also impose some
negative externalities on that zone. A conditional use permit allows
that city to provide the necessary property uses and control the
negative impact of that use.
Take a typical residential zone in Portland, Oregon, as an
example of the importance of conditional uses. Within a residential
zone, we would expect to find primarily single-family dwellings.
Therefore, it would come as no surprise to find “household living” is
10
a permitted use within this zone. Furthermore, within this zone
you would not expect to find railroad yards, waste disposal facilities,
or manufacturing plants. Unsurprisingly, such uses are not permitted
11
in residential zones in Portland. However, the people living in a
residential zone desire more than just housing within their zone. The
people living there will need schools for their children to attend and
hospitals for when accidents occur, as well as churches, parks, and
other community facilities. These are all examples of conditional uses
12
within Portland residential zones. While these uses are needed
within that zone, they are not similar in nature to a house. They
create noise and light pollution, increase traffic, and may lead to
safety concerns within a residential zone. Thus, allowing them as
conditional uses allows the planning authority to provide necessary
services, while at the same time ameliorating the negative
consequences of these uses. The planning authority can ameliorate
these negative externalities by imposing conditions aimed at limiting
these negative effects.
Portland’s zoning ordinance explains why conditional uses are
necessary. Portland’s ordinance states:
Certain uses are conditional uses instead of being allowed
outright, although they may have beneficial effects and serve
important public interests. They are subject to the conditional use
regulations because they may, but do not necessarily, have
significant adverse effects on the environment, overburden public
services, change the desired character of an area, or create major
nuisances. A review of these uses is necessary due to the potential
individual or cumulative impacts they may have on the
surrounding area or neighborhood. The conditional use review
10. PORTLAND, OR., CODE § 33.110.120
https://www.portlandoregon.gov/bps/article/53295.
11. Id.
12. Id.
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provides an opportunity to allow the use when there are minimal
impacts, to allow the use but impose mitigation measures to
address identified concerns, or to deny the use if the concerns
13
cannot be resolved.

Thus, when used properly, conditional use permits provide a
great benefit to a community. They allow a community to provide
uses that “serve important public interests,” while giving the
14
community the power to reduce the negative effects of that use.
Despite the positive benefits from adopting conditional uses
within a zoning ordinance, there is often much confusion about how
the permits operate. On the surface, conditional use permits seem
the same as other zoning devices, such as variances and special
exemptions. However, conditional use permits both function and
operate differently.
Recently, the Idaho Supreme Court was tasked with
enumerating the differences between conditional use permits and
15
other means of providing flexibility within a zoning plan. In Burns
Holdings, LLC v. Teton County, Burns Holding, LLC sought to
16
build a concrete batch plant near the city of Driggs, Idaho. The
Driggs zoning ordinance stated “‘[a]ny building or structure or
portion thereof hereafter erected shall not exceed forty-five (45) feet
17
in height unless approved by conditional use permit.’” Relying on
this language, Burns filed an application for a conditional use permit
18
to erect a structure seventy-five feet high. The city planning and
19
zoning department approved Burns’ application. The application
20
then was sent to the county for approval. The county, however,
21
was confused. It did not know what decision it was supposed to
22
make. Additionally, the county was unsure “whether the matter
being considered was an appeal from the decision of the city
13. Id. at § 33.815.010, available at http://www.portlandoregon.gov/bps/article/
53475.
14. Id.
15. See Burns Holdings, LLC v. Teton Cnty. Bd. of Comm’rs, 272 P.3d 412, 413
(Idaho 2012).
16. Id.
17. Id. at 414 (quoting DRIGGS, IDAHO, CODE & ORDINANCES ch. 2, § 13(c)).
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
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planning and zoning department or a decision for the county to
23
make.” Furthermore, the county did not know whether Burns’
application was for a variance or a conditional use permit, even
24
though Burns filed an application for a conditional use permit.
After much debate, and not really resolving any of its uncertainties,
25
the county denied Burns’ application for a conditional use permit.
Eventually, the matter found its way before the Idaho Supreme
Court, which affirmed the denial of the conditional use permit and,
more importantly, clarified the difference between a variance and a
26
conditional use permit. Justice Eismann, writing for the court,
explained “[a] variance is a means of obtaining a waiver of certain
requirements of a zoning ordinance,” such as bulk, height, and
27
placement requirements. Additionally, “[a] variance can only be
granted ‘upon a showing of undue hardship because of
characteristics of the site and that the variance is not in conflict with
28
the public interest.’” A conditional use permit, on the other hand,
29
relates to the proposed use of property. Such a permit may be
granted only if the proposed use is conditionally permitted by the
terms of the ordinance, subject to conditions pursuant to the
30
ordinance, and not in conflict with the zoning plan.
The court continued, stating that a conditional use permit
requires the zoning authority “to require specified types of
conditions . . . to mitigate the adverse effects that the development
and/or operation of the proposed use may have upon other
properties or upon the ability of the political subdivisions to provide
31
[necessary] services . . . .” What is more, the Idaho Code provides a
non-exhaustive list of the types of conditions that can be attached to
32
a conditional use permit. Some of the conditions that may be
attached include (1) minimizing adverse impacts on other properties;
(2) assuring the property is properly maintained; (3) requiring on- or

23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
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Id.
Id. at 416.
Id. (footnote omitted).
Id. (citation omitted).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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off-site public facilities; and (4) “[r]equiring mitigation of effects of
the proposed development upon” schools and other services
33
delivered by a political subdivision.
In addition to differences in the purposes of a variance and a
conditional use permit, “[t]he nature of the hearing for the issuance
34
of a variance and a [conditional use permit] will also differ.” The
hearing for a variance will focus on the applicant proving there is
“‘undue hardship because of characteristics of the site and that the
35
variance is not in conflict with the public interest.’” On the other
hand, the hearing for a conditional use permit will generally “focus
36
upon the conditions that should be attached to the permit.”
Therefore, despite a conditional use permit’s similarities to other
zoning devices, such as variances, the conditional use permit stands
alone in its important role. The conditional use permit allows a
political subdivision to provide needed uses to an area that otherwise
would not be allowed in that area. This increased flexibility is a
powerful tool in the arsenal of a zoning authority.
B. How the Conditional Use Permitting Process Works
The process of obtaining a conditional use permit is relatively
simple. An individual seeking a permit simply applies to the
designated authority, and if the application is denied, appeals to the
appropriate authority. However, what happens during the
application process is not that simple. A recent case before the
Supreme Court of South Dakota ably demonstrates the typical
37
process required to obtain a conditional use permit. Mark Meier, a
farmer, desired to build two hog confinement facilities on his
38
property. This use was zoned as a conditional use in the zone
39
where his property was located. Meier began his quest to construct
the hog confinement facilities by filing an application with the local
40
Board of Adjustments. After conducting a public hearing, where
Meier and the general public were allowed to speak, the Board of
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

IDAHO CODE ANN. § 67-6512(d)(8) (West 2014).
Burns Holdings, 272 P.3d at 417.
Id. (quoting IDAHO CODE ANN. § 67-6516).
Id.
In re Conditional Use Permit Denied to Meier, 613 N.W.2d 523 (S.D. 2000).
Id. at 524.
Id. at 525.
Id. at 524.
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Adjustments took the matter under consideration and voted to deny
41
the conditional use permit. However, the denial of the permit was
42
not the end of the process. Here, as in most states, the conditional
use permitting statute provided a means of appealing the board’s
43
decision.
Following the denial, Meier appealed the decision to the local
44
circuit court. At the circuit court, “Meier presented numerous
witnesses and pieces of documentary evidence” to prove that he
45
complied with the local zoning ordinance. The court affirmed the
46
denial of Meier’s application, and Meier appealed again. On appeal,
the Supreme Court of South Dakota affirmed in part, reversed in part,
47
and remanded because the trial court applied the wrong standard.
The ordinance governing Meier requires the following before a
conditional use permit is granted: (1) a written application indicating
the section of the zoning ordinance under which the conditional use
is sought and the grounds for which it is requested; (2) notice of
public hearing and the holding of a hearing; (3) the zoning board to
make particular findings of fact that it has authority to grant the
conditional use permit and that “the granting of the conditional use
will not adversely affect the public interest;” (4) additional findings
that the conditional use meets certain general conditions relating to
traffic, parking, proper disposal of refuse, etc.; and (5) a finding that
the proposed use meets the specific criteria set forth in the zoning
48
ordinance relating to that particular conditional use.
This detailed and specific statutory scheme is how a conditional
use permitting statute should look and function. The statutory
scheme provides a clear process for the applicant to follow.
Additionally, the statute provides clear standards the zoning board
should apply. The statute lists specific negative effects, which make
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Compare id. at 524 with SLC CODE § 21A.33.
44. Meier, 613 N.W.2d at 524. In other jurisdictions, there are often lengthier appeals
processes, which require an appeal to a zoning board or city council before the applicant may
resort to judicial assistance. See, e.g., SLC CODE §§ 21A.54.156–21A.54.170.
45. Meier, 613 N.W.2d at 524.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 530.
48. See id. at 525–27 (quoting the Aurora County Zoning ordinance governing
conditional use permits and “performance standards” for commercial animal feeding
operations).
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the use merely a conditional use and not a permitted use. This list
provides the board with clear directions about what the board should
look at when deciding whether to grant or deny the application for a
conditional use permit. Even more importantly, it provides the board
with a clear idea of the types of conditions the board can properly
49
attach to the conditional use permit if it is granted.
C. “Reasonable Conditions”
So far, our discussion has focused on the purpose of conditional
use permits and the process for obtaining one. Some of the key
factors in any analysis of a conditional use permit are the conditions
attached to an application for a permit that is granted. Conditions
are attached to a conditional use permit to ameliorate the negative
effects of that use. Many states regulate the imposition of conditions
by requiring that any conditions attached to a conditional use permit
be “reasonable.” For example, the Utah Code section authorizing
the use of conditional use permits states “[a] conditional use shall be
50
approved if reasonable conditions are proposed.” Most states and
51
cities have similar provisions. While most localities require that
conditions be “reasonable,” the meaning of that term is typically
undefined by the governing statutes and codes.
However, despite a dearth of definitions for the term
“reasonable,” the proper definition is readily apparent. A condition is
reasonable if it is directly related to the proposed use and is aimed at
mitigating the potential detrimental effects of the use. For example,
New York courts have held zoning boards can “impose ‘reasonable
conditions and restrictions as are directly related to and incidental to
the proposed use of the property,’ and aimed at minimizing the
52
adverse impact to an area that might result” from the proposed use.
The court in St. Onge v. Donovan listed several reasonable
49. In the Meier case, however, we did not see this in action because his application
was denied.
50. UTAH CODE ANN. § 10-9a-507(2)(a) (West 2005) (emphasis added).
51. See, e.g., RIVERSIDE, CAL., CODE § 19.760.010(B) (2007); KERSEY, COLO., LAND
USE CODE § 3.9(D)(3) (2014); LONG LAKE, MINN., CODE § 28(4)(C) (2008); N.Y., TOWN
LAW § 274-b(4) (1998); LA GRANDE, OR., LAND DEV. CODE & ORDINANCE 3210 §
8.5.004(E) (2013); CLALLAM COUNTY, WASH., CODE § 33.27.040(2) (2014). This is just a
small sampling of the numerous state and city codes allowing “reasonable” conditions to be
attached to conditional use permits that are approved by the local zoning board.
52. St. Onge v. Donovan, 522 N.E.2d 1019, 1023 (N.Y. 1988) (quoting Pearson v.
Shoemaker, 202 N.Y.S.2d 779, 780 (Gen. Term 1960).
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53

conditions. The reasonable conditions the court listed would
“relate ‘to fences, safety devices, landscaping, screening and access
roads . . . outdoor lighting and noises, [] enclosure of buildings []
relating to emission of odors, dust, smoke, refuse matter, vibration
noise, and other factors incidental to comfort, peace, enjoyment,
54
health or safety of the surrounding area.’” The court reasoned
conditions such as those listed “are proper because they relate
directly to the use of the land” and because they “are corrective
measures designed to protect neighboring properties against the
55
possible adverse effects of that use.” In addition, the court stated
conditions may be improper if the conditions do not seek to
56
ameliorate the negative effects of the land use.
Courts in other jurisdictions have given similar meaning to the
phrase “reasonable conditions.” For instance, the Court of Appeals
in Washington held “reasonable conditions” are a necessary part of
57
the conditional use permit scheme. The court stated the zoning
board had “inherent authority to impose conditions” on a
conditional use permit when the conditions “ensur[e] the use meets
58
the county’s zoning goals as set forth in [the general plan].” The
Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania similarly held “a reasonable
condition must (1) relate to a standard in the applicable zoning
ordinance [or state code] and (2) be supported by evidence in the
59
record before the zoning [] board.” In addition, the Court of
Appeals of North Carolina stated “a condition imposed on a
conditional use permit is improperly imposed when it is not related
60
to the use of the land.”
A recent case from Missouri also emphasizes that a “reasonable
61
condition” is a condition related to the use of the property. In that
53. Id.
54. Id. (quoting Pearson, 202 N.Y.S.2d at 781).
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. See, e.g., Schlotfeldt v. Benton Cnty., 292 P.3d 807, 810–11 (Wash. Ct. App. 2013)
(citation omitted) (stating that “reasonable conditions may be necessary” to achieve zoning
goals).
58. Id. at 811.
59. Whitehall Fiduciary, LLC v. Zoning Hearing Bd., 49 A.3d 945, 948 (Pa. Commw.
Ct. 2012).
60. Nw. Prop. Grp. v. Town of Carrboro, 687 S.E.2d 1, 5 (N.C. Ct. App. 2009)
(quoting Overton v. Camden City, 574 S.E.2d 150, 153 (N.C. Ct. App. 2002)).
61. Curry Inv. Co. v. Bd. of Zoning Adjustment, 399 S.W.3d 106, 107 (Mo. Ct. App.
2013).
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case, a property owner sought a conditional use permit to open a
62
pawn shop. The Board of Zoning Adjustment conditioned approval
of the permit on the removal of two nonconforming outdoor
63
advertising signs. The court, however, noted that the signs were a
64
valid nonconforming use, and held this condition was unreasonable.
The court reached this conclusion because this condition was
65
unrelated to the conditional use permit.
When viewed together, these cases make it clear that a condition
is only reasonable when it relates to the proposed use of the property
and the condition serves to further a legitimate zoning interest.
Thus, the imposition of conditions enhances a local zoning board’s
ability to provide flexibility within its jurisdiction. The local board
can approve a use that will improve the character of the community
while at the same time limiting the negative effects of that use.
II. PROBLEMS INHERENT IN THE CONDITIONAL USE PERMIT
SCHEME
Conditional use permits, by their nature, cause problems. They
were created to provide flexibility. This flexibility, while it can be
beneficial, also generates uncertainty and gives great power to the
officials who make the decision to grant or deny a conditional use
permit. This is the problem inherent in conditional use permits. While
providing great flexibility to local land use boards is laudable, and
necessary to provide for effective planning, the flexibility is also the
cause of numerous problems.
This Part will address some of the most common problems with
conditional use permits. Often, the problem originates in the
standards outlined in the governing statutes, but sometimes the
problems are the result of the way the conditions apply to a permit.
First, this Part will address the problems created by vague standards
in the statutes authorizing the issuance of conditional use permits.
Second, it will discuss how conditional use permits can run afoul of
the nondelegation doctrine. Third, it will examine what happens
when a condition imposed on a permit is an exaction. Fourth, this
Part will scrutinize situations where conditions violate a property
62.
63.
64.
65.

Id. at 107.
Id.
Id. at 109–10.
Id.
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owner’s vested rights, or the owner’s rights under a nonconforming
use statute. Finally, this Part will examine various other
constitutional issues common to conditional use permits.
A. Vague Standards
One of the more common problems with conditional use
permitting statutes is vagueness. The Fourteenth Amendment
commands that no state shall “deprive any person of life, liberty, or
66
property, without due process of law.” One of the ways a law may
be unconstitutionally vague is if the law “authorizes or even
67
Thus,
encourages arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.”
statutes “must provide explicit standards for those who apply them”
to avoid “resolution on an ad hoc and subjective basis, with the
68
attendant dangers of arbitrary and discriminatory application.”
While a vague standard serves a purpose in the conditional use
permit context, the standard cannot be so vague that it does not
provide certainty to landowners. As noted above, one of the primary
purposes of the conditional use permit is to provide flexibility to land
use boards. Indeed, this flexibility is a great benefit to political
subdivisions, in that it allows for controlled growth and for greater
control of potentially problematic uses. This type of flexibility is
good. However, when the statutes governing conditional use permits
become so vague that they leave almost unbridled decision-making
powers with land use boards, then the statutes become problematic.
Several problems result from vague standards in conditional use
permitting statutes. First, as noted by the Supreme Court of
Wisconsin, vague standards “‘open[] up both individual zoning
decisions and the zoning ordinance provision itself to constitutional
69
challenges as being arbitrary and capricious.’” The court also noted
that, even if such a challenge does not succeed, “‘the uncertainty to
landowners and citizens alike created by discretionary and/or
70
standardless zoning review should be avoided.’” For example, in
66. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
67. Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 732 (2000) (citing Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S.
41, 56–57 (1999)).
68. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108–09 (1972) (footnote omitted).
69. Town of Rhine v. Bizzell, 751 N.W.2d 780, 798 (Wis. 2008) (quoting John B.
Bredin, Common Problems with Zoning Ordinances, AM. PLANNING ASS’N ZONING NEWS,
Nov. 2002, at 2).
70. Id. (quoting Bredin, supra note 69, at 2).
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Town of Rhine v. Bizzell, the court was concerned with standards that
were “simply not specific enough that one can reasonably say” what it
71
takes to comply with the governing statutes. The court in this case
took umbrage with standards for obtaining a conditional use permit
72
that were subject to “significant interpretation.” These standards
contained items such as recognizing the “needs of agriculture” and
73
preserving natural growth. Contrast these standards with those
mentioned above in the case of farmer Meier who was seeking a
74
permit to build a facility for the housing of hogs. The standards in
that case were much more specific and tailored to Meier’s particular
75
use. Thus, when the standards for issuing a conditional use permit
are too vague, or cannot be tied to a legitimate legislative purpose, the
76
ordinance is likely to be struck down.
Second, such vague standards may become an unconstitutional
prior restraint. The United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Wisconsin explained:
A zoning ordinance is an unconstitutional prior restraint if it:
(1) vests the governmental decision maker with unbridled
discretion to determine whether it will issue the permit or license;
or (2) fails to place limits on the time within which the
governmental decision maker must make the permit or licensing
77
determination.

In this case, a statute requiring conditional use permits for the
operation of an adult entertainment business was found to be too
vague because it left too much discretion in the hands of the
governmental decision maker and had no specific time limits, and
78
was therefore an unconstitutional prior restraint. The court came to
this conclusion because the governing ordinance did not offer the
zoning board “guidance respecting the proper considerations in

71. Bizzell, 751 N.W.2d at 800.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. In re Conditional Use Permit Denied to Meier, 613 N.W.2d 523, 524 (S.D. 2000).
75. Id.
76. Id. at 530.
77. Green Valley Inv. LLC v. Cnty. of Winnebago, 790 F. Supp. 2d 947, 959 (E.D.
Wis. 2011).
78. Id. at 959–60 (“[T]his is ‘[a] scheme that fails to set reasonable time limits on the
decisionmaker [and] creates the risk of indefinitely suppressing permissible speech.’”) (quoting
FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, 227 (1990)).
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determining whether proposed conditional uses” were appropriate.
In addition, the statute allowed the zoning board to consider “‘any
80
[additional factors] they deem appropriate.’” Accordingly, the court
held this “unbridled discretion” in the hands of the zoning board
“‘creates the risk of indefinitely suppressing permissible speech,’”
81
and thus constituted an unconstitutional prior restraint.
Thus, even though conditional use permits are intended to
provide flexibility, and are designed to leave decision making in the
hands of local officials, the governing statutes must contain clear
standards. When the statutes are vague, as is often the case, the
statutes are susceptible to challenges for vagueness and as prior
restraints. As the court noted in Bizzell, the possibility that a statute
might be a prior restraint can adversely affects landowners and can
have a negative effect on the growth of an area.
B. Nondelegation Problems with Conditional Use Permits
In addition to vague standards causing problems with due process
rights and with unconstitutional prior restraints, standards that are
too vague may run afoul of the nondelegation doctrine. This
“doctrine is rooted in the principle of separation of powers that
82
underlies our tripartite system of Government.” The Constitution
states “[a]ll legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a
83
Congress of the United States.” Thus, to uphold the “‘integrity . . .
of the system of government ordained by the Constitution,’” the
Supreme Court has interpreted this clause to mean Congress
generally cannot delegate its legislative authority to another branch of
84
This doctrine also limits the extent to which
government.
85
legislatures can delegate authority to agencies.
However, legislative bodies “simply cannot do [their] job absent
86
an ability to delegate power under broad general directives.”
Therefore, even though a legislature “generally cannot” delegate its
79. Id. at 959.
80. Id. (citation omitted).
81. Id. at 960 (quoting FW/PBS, 493 U.S. at 227).
82. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 371 (1989).
83. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1.
84. Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 371–72 (quoting Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 692 (1892)).
85. See, e.g., David J. Barron & Elena Kagan, Chevron’s Nondelegation Doctrine, 2001
SUP. CT. REV. 201, 201.
86. Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 372.
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authority, a legislature can legally delegate some authority if the
legislature “‘shall lay down by legislative act an intelligible principle
to which the person or body authorized . . . is directed to
87
conform.’” While the precise meaning of “intelligible principle”
88
has evaded judicial definition, the Court has provided some
guidance on this point. The Court, in American Power & Light Co.
v. SEC, stated it is “constitutionally sufficient” if the intelligible
principle “clearly delineates the general policy, the public agency
which is to apply it, and the boundaries of this delegated
89
authority.” Nevertheless, these standards are vague and have led
some to wonder if the nondelegation doctrine is enforceable in any
90
measure.
In the context of zoning, it is “clear” that the power to zone
“involves legislative functions which cannot be [] delegated under
91
constitutional principles of separation of governmental powers.” It
is equally clear that a “zoning plan may properly permit
administrators [such as a zoning board] to ‘find facts,’” and to
determine, when appropriate standards are given by the legislature,
92
whether variances or exceptions are permissible. Furthermore, the
power to grant conditional use permits is also a delegation of
93
power. However, many provisions relating to conditional use
permits have been struck down because the zoning authority was left
“absolutely unguided” in determining whether to issue such a

87. Id. (quoting J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409
(1928)).
88. Patrick M. Garry, Accommodating the Administrative State: The Interrelationship
Between the Chevron and Nondelegation Doctrines, 38 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 921, 933–34 (2006)
(“Yet while acknowledging the intelligible principle test as the measure of whether a statute
violates the nondelegation doctrine, the Court has declined to give any strict definition of an
intelligible principle.”) (footnote omitted).
89. Am. Power & Light Co. v. SEC, 329 U.S. 90, 105 (1946).
90. See Garry, supra note 88 at 938. See also Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S.
457, 487 (2001) (Thomas, J., concurring) (expressing concern that the intelligible principle
doctrine does not serve its purpose in limiting legislative cessions of power); Mistretta, 488 U.S.
at 416 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“What legislated standard, one must wonder, can possibly be too
vague to survive judicial scrutiny, when we have repeatedly upheld, in various contexts, a ‘public
interest’ standard?”).
91. Shipley, supra note 9, at 1086 (footnote omitted).
92. Id.
93. Nassau Children’s House, Inc. v. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 430 N.Y.S.2d 683, 686
(App. Div. 1980) (“A special exception permit can be issued only upon fulfillment of the
conditions mandated in the delegation of power contained in the zoning ordinance.”).
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94

permit. Nevertheless, when the delegation of authority to issue
conditional use permits “contain[s] sufficient restrictive standards for
the guidance of the administrative officials,” the delegation of power
95
has usually been upheld as constitutional.
For example, the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania stated
“[i]t is well settled” that cities possess only the powers “expressly
96
granted to them by the [legislature].” In In re Maibach, LLC, the
court grappled with whether the Board of Commissioner’s
“Condition 66,” (out of ninety-eight conditions attached to
97
Maibach’s conditional use permit) was proper. Guiding the court’s
decision were the “express standards” of the zoning ordinance
98
related to the specific conditional use Maibach sought. In the end,
the condition was struck down as an impermissible fee; however, the
process of this case is illustrative of how a properly drafted
99
conditional use statute avoids the problem of nondelegation.
Because the legislature provided “express” criteria for the Board of
Commissioners to apply, the statute did not impermissibly delegate
100
the legislature’s powers.
In another case, a federal district court looked briefly at this
issue. In Schulz v. Milne, the facts gave rise to a “cognizable claim”
101
of an unconstitutional de facto delegation. The court in this case
came to its conclusion after examining two Supreme Court cases
102
where the Court found an unconstitutional delegation of power.
The delegations of power at issue in those cases detailed “‘no
103
standard by which the power thus given [was] to be exercised,’”
and made the parties “‘free to withhold consent for selfish reasons or
104
arbitrarily and [to] subject [others] to their will or caprice.’” Such
94. Shipley, supra note 9, at 1087.
95. Id. at 1109 (footnote omitted).
96. In re Maibach, LLC, 26 A.3d 1213, 1216 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2011) (citing
Hydropress Envtl. Servs., Inc. v. Twp. Of Upper Mount Bethel, 836 A.2d 912 (Pa. 2003)).
97. Id. at 1214. In this case, Maibach was seeking a conditional use permit to operate an
ethanol production plant. The Board of Commissioners approved the permit, subject to
ninety-eight conditions. Id. at 1214.
98. Id. at 1216.
99. See id. at 1217.
100. Id.
101. Schulz v. Milne, 849 F. Supp. 708, 712 (N.D. Cal. 1994).
102. Id. at 711.
103. Id. (quoting Eubank v. City of Richmond, 226 U.S. 137, 144 (1912)).
104. Id. (quoting Wash. ex rel Seattle Title Trust Co. v. Roberge, 278 U.S. 116, 122
(1928)).
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a standardless grant of zoning power the Court said is “‘repugnant’”
105
to the Fourteenth Amendment’s promise of due process. In this
case, the delegation challenge was sustained because the power to
grant the permit rested in the board personally, without any clear
106
standards from the legislature for the board to apply.
Accordingly, when a conditional use permitting statute does not
provide clear standards for a zoning board to apply, the statute may
constitute an unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority.
When no “intelligible standard” is present, as in the Schulz case, the
process may violate the due process clause as well as the
constitutional command against the improper delegation of
legislative powers.
C. When Conditions Become Exactions
Even when standards governing conditional use permits are not
vague, they can cause problems. One particularly frightening
problem is when the conditions attached to a conditional use permit
are monetary or real property exactions. An exaction is a condition
for development imposed on a piece of property requiring the
developer to pay money or give property to mitigate anticipated
negative effects of the development. However, as the Court noted in
Nollan v. California Coastal Commission and Dolan v. City of
107
Tigard, sometimes an exaction can be a taking. The same problem
can occur when a condition imposed on a conditional use permit is
an exaction.
Several cases from California underscore the dangers of imposing
exactions as “reasonable conditions” on a conditional use permit. In
Lambert v. City & County of San Francisco, the California Court of
Appeals noted conditions attached to the approval of a permit “must
108
‘substantially advance legitimate state interests.’” It further noted
when a condition attached to such a permit “exact[s] money or real
property from landowners,” it presents “an inherent and heightened
risk that local government[s] will manipulate the police power to
impose” unreasonable conditions unrelated to legitimate state
105. Id. (quoting Seattle Title Trust, 278 U.S. at 122).
106. Id. at 712.
107. See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 383–84 (1994); Nollan v. Cal. Coastal
Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 831–32 (1987).
108. Lambert v. City & Cnty of S.F., 67 Cal. Rptr. 2d 562, 571 (Ct. App. 1997)
(quoting Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980)).
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109

interests. Thus, the government entity imposing the exaction on a
permit must demonstrate an essential nexus between the exaction
110
and a legitimate state interest.
In a subsequent case involving an exaction, the California
Supreme Court noted exactions imposed on an ad hoc basis are
much more troublesome than exactions that are legislatively
111
When an
mandated, such as an exaction included in a statute.
exaction is imposed as a condition on a conditional use permit, it is
often an ad hoc decision, not a result of a statutory command. Thus,
exactions should be subject to heightened scrutiny. The California
Supreme Court stated “[a]d hoc individual monetary exactions
deserve special judicial scrutiny mainly because, affecting fewer
citizens and evading systematic assessment, they are more likely to
112
escape such political controls.”
In In re Maibach, LLC, mentioned above, “Condition 66”
required Maibach to “pay one-half cent . . . for each gallon of ethanol
113
The Board of
produced” at the proposed ethanol plant.
Commissioners required this fee “to provide emergency response
services and to address other issues impacting the general public
114
This fee would fall within the
infrastructures of the Township.”
definition of an exaction. Additionally, on its face, this may seem to
“impose [a] reasonable condition[] on the grant of a conditional use
115
[permit].” However, a reasonable condition relates to the “specific
116
117
zoning ordinance at issue.” This condition was not reasonable.
118
The court reached this conclusion on state law grounds. The
local ordinances made it illegal for a municipality “to require as a
condition for approval of a land development . . . payment of any offsite

109. Id. (quoting Ehrlich v. City of Culver City, 911 P.2d 429, 439 (Cal. 1996) (plurality
opinion)).
110. Id.
111. San Remo Hotel L.P. v. City & Cnty. of S.F., 41 P.3d 87, 105 (Cal. 2002)
(requiring a hotel to pay $567,000 as a condition of approval of their application).
112. Id.
113. In re Maibach, LLC, 26 A.3d 1213, 1215 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2011) (citation
omitted).
114. Id. (citation omitted).
115. Id. at 1216 (citation omitted).
116. Id. (citation omitted).
117. Id. at 1220.
118. Id. at 1216.
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improvements” unless specifically authorized in the statute. Even
though there was a clear legislative command that exactions such as
this were not to be imposed on conditional use permits, the Board of
Commissioners attached an exaction as a condition of granting the
120
permit. What is more troubling, the board imposed this condition,
and phrased it the way it did, because it knew two other businesses
121
had already accepted an illegal exaction such as this one. This case
provides a prime example of the situations described by the
California Supreme Court, where exactions on conditional use
permits need special judicial scrutiny to avoid the problem illustrated
by this case.
A case from New Jersey further illustrates the conditional
122
exactions problem. Despite clear law stating the imposition of a
financial condition “must be authorized by statute and implemented
by municipal ordinance,” a municipality attached a condition that a
123
developer must pay the city $4,000 per unit built. This law was in
place because, in the absence of such standards, “the possibilities for
abuse in [] negotiations between an applicant and a regulatory body,
124
no matter how worthy the cause, are unlimited.” The approval of
permits without clear standards would result in permits granted or
denied “depending upon the board members’ arbitrary sense of how
125
much an applicant should pay.”
Therefore, when exactions are imposed as a condition on a
conditional use permit, these conditions are deserving of special
judicial scrutiny. Such conditions may constitute unreasonable
conditions, but may escape political control for at least two reasons.
First, and most importantly, accepting the condition will often result
in the permit being granted. This places great power in the hands of
the government entity in charge of granting the permit. In essence,
the government entity can hold the property owner hostage. Second,
if the property owner is not a sophisticated developer or a wealthy

119. Id. at 1217 (citation omitted).
120. Id. at 1214.
121. Id. at 1218.
122. Pond Run Watershed Ass’n v. Twp. of Hamilton Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 937
A.2d 334 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2008).
123. Id. at 349 (quoting Nunziato v. Planning Bd. of Edgewater Borough, 541 A.2d
1105, 1108 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1988)).
124. Id. (quoting Nunziato, 541 A.2d at 1110).
125. Id. (quoting Nunziato, 541 A.2d at 1110).
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landowner, the property owner may not have the funds or the
knowledge to challenge the exactions. Thus, such exactions will evade
systematic assessment and escape political controls.
D. Problems with Existing Non-conforming Uses and Vested Rights
Often, planning commissions attach expiration dates as a
condition on a conditional use permit. While this may seem like a
good idea by providing an opportunity to review the use and ensure
it is not adversely affecting the community, it is not. Conditional use
126
permits typically run with the land. Not only may this condition
not be “reasonable” (i.e., not relating to an anticipated negative
effect of a proposed conditional use), but this particular condition
may also run afoul of nonconforming use statutes and vested rights
statutes. For example, under Utah law, property owners have a
vested right once they have submitted a land use application
complying with applicable ordinances and they have paid the
associated fees, absent any compelling, countervailing public
127
Furthermore, under Utah law, even if the zoning
interest.
ordinance were to change after the conditional use permit was
granted, property owners have the right to continue using the
128
property for the previous permitted use.
A case from California shows some of the problems inherent in
attaching an expiration date to a conditional use permit. In
California, as in Utah and many other states, receiving and relying on
a conditional use permit would grant the permit holder the right to
continue use of the property even if the zoning laws change
129
subsequent to the permit being granted. In Goat Hill Tavern v.
City of Costa Mesa, the court of appeals affirmed the lower court’s
decision that the Goat Hill Tavern had vested rights to continue
130
operations and that its conditional use permit should be renewed.
Goat Hill Tavern had been in continuous operation since 1955, a
131
period of more than thirty years. In 1988, the owner expanded the
132
tavern into adjoining commercial space to add a game room. After
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
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Cohn v. Cnty. Bd. of Supervisors, 135 Cal. App. 2d 180 (Dist. Ct. App. 1955).
UTAH CODE ANN. § 10-9a-509 (LexisNexis 2012).
Id. at § 10-9a-511.
Goat Hill Tavern v. City of Costa Mesa, 8 Cal. Rptr. 2d 385, 386 (Ct. App. 1992).
Id.
Id.
Id.
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the fact, the owner sought a conditional use permit, which he
received with the condition that the permit would expire after six
133
A year later, after receiving noise complaints, the city
months.
discovered the permit had expired and required the tavern to apply
for a new permit, which was granted with a three-month expiration
134
period. After the three-month period, the tavern applied for a new
conditional use permit and received it with a new condition limiting
135
the tavern’s hours of operation. Because of the new condition, the
tavern filed suit and the district court stayed the enforcement of the
136
new condition. When this permit expired, the tavern was denied a
137
renewal due to public complaints about noise and trash. However,
these complaints could not be linked to the tavern because there
were several other bars in the vicinity and a nearby parking lot that
138
served as a gathering point for homeless people in the area. When
the conditional use permit expired, the city argued the tavern “lost
139
The court stated a renewal
all right to continue in business.”
request can be properly denied only “if the permittee fails to comply
with reasonable terms or conditions expressed in the permit” and if
140
the business would constitute a nuisance.
A recent case in the Utah Court of Appeals shows an instance
where a challenge similar to the one raised in Goat Hill could have
been made. In Stevens v. LaVerkin City, Stevens had owned and
141
operated an auto repair shop. Stevens received a valid conditional
142
use permit in 2000. Later, he acquired a second lot and received a
143
six-month conditional use permit for that lot. After six months, he
obtained a new conditional use permit for the second lot with
144
additional conditions attached. In 2004, the city council decided
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 387.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 391 (footnote omitted).
140. Id. (quoting O’Hagen v. Bd. of Zoning Adjustment, 96 Cal. Rptr. 484, 488 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1971)).
141. 183 P.3d 1059, 1062 (Utah Ct. App. 2008) (showing how the “auto repair shop”
had more in common with a junkyard than a mechanic’s shop).
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id.
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not to revoke Stevens’ original permit, but instead to change it to a
145
temporary six-month permit with additional conditions imposed.
146
Later, in 2005, the city refused to renew both permits. Stevens
later filed a “complaint against the City alleging a single cause of
147
action: inverse condemnation.” Since Stevens never appealed any
of the decisions regarding the conditional use permit and his
148
business license expired, the court did not grant him relief.
Some additional facts from Stevens highlight the sorts of abuses
possible when conditional use permits expire. Stevens was operating
149
a business pursuant to a valid conditional use permit. The facts of
the case state “at some point” the city began considering expanding
150
the road that Stevens’ first permit was on. Because of the city’s
consideration of widening the road, the city entered into
151
The
negotiations with Stevens to purchase his property.
152
While the
negotiations broke down in December 2005.
negotiations were taking place, the city refused to renew the
153
Even more
conditional use permits for both of Stevens’ lots.
startling, in January 2006, just a month after negotiations broke
154
down, the city decided not to renew Stevens’ business license.
While these facts do not conclusively show the city abused its powers
in not renewing Stevens’ permits and business license, the facts
demonstrate the potential abuses requiring renewal of conditional
use permits may lead to. A city can use the threat of not renewing a
permit to force a landowner to discontinue a valid use. Furthermore,
a city can attach additional conditions to the permit that are not in
accordance with the zoning ordinances, which may violate the
permittee’s vested rights.
While the court did not review the city’s decisions to modify
Stevens’ conditional use permits because he did not properly appeal
those decisions, the court seemed like it wanted to address this issue.

145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
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The court pointed out Stevens brought only “a single cause of
155
action.” This seems to imply there are other issues that he could have
brought. Because Stevens did not properly appeal the decisions about
the permits, the court could not review those decisions. If Stevens had
properly appealed the decisions regarding his conditional use permits,
the court would have had an opportunity to address this issue.
Thus, as demonstrated by these two cases, it is unlikely that an
expiration date attached as a condition to a conditional use permit is
a “reasonable” condition. As shown in Goat Hill, attaching an
expiration date to a conditional use permit can create a host of legal
issues. First, the expiration of the permit may violate the permit
holder’s vested rights. Once the property owner has received a
permit, she has the statutory right in most states to continue that use
even if the zoning ordinances change in the future. If there is an
expiration date attached to the conditional use permit, and the
zoning ordinance changes, the government entity would have
grounds to not renew the permit even though the permit holder has
a right to continue the use as a nonconforming use. Additionally,
when the permit is received, the city’s ability to revoke the permit is
limited to situations where the permit holder does not comply with
reasonable conditions or there is a compelling public necessity (e.g.,
156
the use constitutes a nuisance).
Second, the expiration gives the local board the opportunity to
attach additional conditions to the permit that could unduly burden
the property. In Goat Hill, for example, those additional conditions
157
were eventually struck down by the court.
Third, the renewal process gives the city greater bargaining
power with the permit holder. The city could possibly use its power
to force the property holder to accept new conditions or make
substantial changes to the property to get the conditional use permit
renewed. These possible violations of the permit holder’s rights make
imposing expiration dates on conditional use permits a legally
hazardous decision.
However, there may be circumstances where an expiration date is
a reasonable condition. For example, if the applicant knows the
permit will expire, and there is no guarantee the permit will be
155. Id.
156. See Goat Hill Tavern v. City of Costa Mesa, 8 Cal. Rptr. 2d 385, 391 (Cal. Ct. App.
1992).
157. Id. at 392.
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renewed, this may get around the vested rights issue. If there is no
expectation the use will be allowed following the expiration of the
permit, it cannot be said that the permit holder has relied upon the
permit to establish a right to continue that use. Additionally, it may
be proper to attach an expiration date as part of an effort to inspect
the property to ensure the conditions imposed on the permit are
being met. If the conditions are not being met, such would likely be
valid grounds to revoke the permit and would not violate the
owner’s vested rights.
In addition to expiration dates causing problems, the
extinguishment of a conditional use permit on any other ground
could likewise cause problems. Since conditional use permits run
with the land, the extinguishment of a right to continue to use the
property in the manner previously authorized will also likely result in
legal challenges. For example, a subsequent change in zoning laws
likely would not extinguish the right to use the property in the
formerly permitted manner.
A case from Minnesota illustrates the challenges of extinguishing
a conditional use permit. In White v. City of Elk River, Lorraine
158
White operated a campground in the city of Elk River. After the
campground began operation, the zoning ordinances changed,
turning campgrounds into a non-permitted use, then into a
conditional use, and eventually removing campgrounds entirely from
159
During the period when campgrounds were a
the zone.
conditional use, White applied for, and received, a conditional use
160
permit. When the campground later violated the conditions of the
permit, the city revoked the permit and stated White was no longer
161
authorized to operate the campground. The issue in this case was
whether the receipt of the conditional use permit revoked the
campground’s nonconforming use status. The court held it did
162
The court also held there are four ways in which a
not.
municipality can terminate an owner’s right to continue a
nonconforming use: (1) through eminent domain, (2) by operation
of law when the use has been discontinued for more than a year, (3)
when the use has been destroyed to an extent greater than fifty
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
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percent, and (4) by judicial determination that the use is a
163
Thus, revoking a conditional use permit does not
nuisance.
terminate a property owner’s right to continue a nonconforming use.
Therefore, using the passage of time is another troublesome way
municipalities apply conditions to conditional use permits. The
attachment of expiration dates can lead to violations of the owner’s
vested rights and nonconforming rights. Furthermore, unless there is
notice beforehand, revoking a permit may also be an illegal action by
a government entity.
E. Other Constitutional Problems
Besides problems with vagueness and prior restraints, conditions
attached to conditional use permits can run afoul of other
constitutional rights—especially those guaranteed by the First
Amendment. Two cases demonstrate the potential First Amendment
problems that can arise with conditional use permits. The first deals
with the freedom of speech; the second, with freedom of religion.
In Barbulean v. City of Newburgh, a vague statute created an
164
Barbulean
unconstitutional time, place, and manner restriction.
165
operated an adult video store. After installing thirteen videotape–
166
viewing booths, he was required to obtain a conditional use permit.
When he failed to do so and was subsequently cited, he challenged the
167
constitutionality of that ordinance. The New York court held the
statute was facially unconstitutional because there were insufficient
standards in the statute for the appeals board to determine whether or
168
The court reasoned that
not to grant a conditional use permit.
when the articulated standards for granting a permit are vague, “the
spectre of censorship may exist just as clearly as where there are no
169
standards at all.” The standards in this case raised this spectre of
censorship because the standards included twelve factors, one of which
170
The
gave the board permission to consider anything it wished.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
1978)).
170.

Id. at 52.
Barbulean v. City of Newburgh, 640 N.Y.S.2d 935, 948–49 (N.Y. App. Div. 1995).
Id. at 939.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 944.
Id. at 948 (citing Bayside Enters., Inc. v. Carson, 450 F. Supp. 696, 706 (M.D. Fla.
Id.
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court concluded this statute was unconstitutionally vague, which, in
this case, amounted to an unconstitutional abridgment of Barbulean’s
171
First Amendment rights.
In the second case, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals found a
conditional use permitting scheme violated provisions of the
Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act
172
Centro Familiar Cristiano Buenas Nuevas, a
(“RLUIPA”).
Christian church in Yuma, Arizona, purchased a building on Main
173
However, the church was
Street to hold church services in.
required to get a conditional use permit to hold services in that
174
building. The zoning code required religious organizations to get
a conditional use permit, but allowed other “membership
175
organizations” to operate in that area without a permit. Because
the ordinance singled out religious organizations and treated them
differently from other, similar organizations, the ordinance violated
176
RLUIPA.
While these are just two examples, the constitutional problems
raised by improper conditional use permitting practices are
numerous. As the Supreme Court noted, “[t]he power of censorship
177
The broad
inherent in this type of ordinance reveals its vice.”
powers given to zoning authorities gives them great power to censor.
When standards are vague, that problem is amplified.
III. CONCLUSION
While conditional use permits serve an important function, they
also create a host of problems because of their inherent vagueness.
Conditional use permits are intended to provide flexibility. However,
the intended flexibility often results in overly vague statutes that
create too much uncertainty and give land use boards too much
discretion—discretion that can often violate the rights of the citizens
the zoning ordinance is intended to help. The ordinances can cause
problems with vagueness, nondelegation, exactions, vested rights,
171.
172.
(9th Cir.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
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Id. at 948–49.
Centro Familiar Cristiano Buena Nueva v. City of Yuma, 651 F.3d 1163, 1175
2011).
Id. at 1166.
Id.
Id. at 1166–67.
Id. at 1175.
Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558, 562 (1948).
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and First Amendment rights. As the Supreme Court recently noted,
“land-use permit applicants are especially vulnerable to the type of
coercion that the unconstitutional conditions doctrine prohibits
because the government often has broad discretion to deny a permit
178
that is worth far more than property it would like to take.” When
a property owner applies for a conditional use permit, she should be
able to know with some degree of certainty whether her application
will be accepted and what conditions may attach. Sadly, that is often
not the case. The result is wasted time, money, and sometimes even
a violation of the landowner’s rights.
While there are no easy solutions to this problem, that does not
give us the right to ignore this issue. Conditional use permits serve
an indispensable purpose in our communities. Without these permits
we would be left without schools, grocery stores, or hospitals near
our homes. Thus, we must work to make the statutes clearer and less
open to interpretation, while at the same time leaving enough
discretion in the local zoning commissions to allow the imposition of
reasonable conditions to ameliorate the negative impacts of
conditional uses.
Because of the flexible nature of conditional use permits, the
statutes are purposefully vague. Nevertheless, providing flexibility in
zoning cannot override constitutional and other concerns. Finding
the proper balance between these competing interests is a task of
Gordian proportions. Thus, the problems outlined in this Comment
are likely to continue for as long as conditional use permits exist.
Jacob Green*

178. Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586, 2594 (2013).
* J.D., April 2014, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University.
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